Tanzeel Javid Mir
For Jammu and Kashmir, the question of statehood is no longer merely a political slogan. It has become a question about the nature of governance, democratic accountability and the relationship between an elected government and the administration of the Union.
As the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly enters its autumn session this September, the demand for restoration of statehood has once again occupied centre stage. The current Assembly session is scheduled from September 21 to September 30, 2026, and the issue of statehood has figured prominently in the political discourse surrounding the session.
To understand why the issue continues to matter, one has to look beyond political speeches and understand what actually changed in 2019.
On October 31, 2019, following the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir was reorganised into two Union Territories: Jammu and Kashmir, with a legislature, and Ladakh, without one.
Five years later, Jammu and Kashmir once again received an elected Legislative Assembly. The 2024 Assembly elections were conducted in three phases, and the Election Commission recorded an overall increase in the electorate compared with 2014. The 90-seat Assembly saw the National Conference win 42 seats, the BJP 29 and the Congress six, with other parties and independents winning the remaining seats.
But an elected Assembly and a State Assembly are not constitutionally identical.
Under Section 32 of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, the Union Territory’s Legislative Assembly can make laws on matters in the State List, subject to important exceptions. Public order and police are specifically excluded.
This distinction goes to the heart of the statehood debate.
In a full-fledged State, the elected government exercises considerably broader constitutional authority over the subjects falling within the State List. In the present Union Territory arrangement, however, the Lieutenant Governor retains significant powers, particularly in areas outside the legislative competence of the Assembly and in matters specifically assigned to the Lieutenant Governor under law. Section 53 of the Reorganisation Act expressly provides for the Lieutenant Governor’s discretion in specified areas, including matters outside the Assembly’s legislative competence and matters relating to All India Services and the Anti-Corruption Bureau.
The Centre also amended the Transaction of Business Rules in 2024, including provisions concerning police, public order, All India Services and certain administrative matters.
For an ordinary citizen, however, these constitutional provisions may appear distant. The real question is simpler: Will restoration of statehood change the way government responds to the people?
The answer depends on what one expects from statehood.
Statehood would primarily alter the constitutional structure within which Jammu and Kashmir’s elected government functions. It would give greater institutional weight to the elected government and Legislature in areas that are presently outside their control. It would also change the political relationship between the elected government and the Lieutenant Governor.
But statehood should not be presented as a solution to every problem facing J&K.
It will not automatically create government jobs. It will not by itself solve unemployment, improve every road, revive every traditional industry, end drug abuse or guarantee better administration. Those challenges require policy, investment, institutional capacity and accountable governance irrespective of constitutional status.
There is also another point that deserves clarity. Restoration of statehood should not be confused with restoration of the pre-August 2019 constitutional position. The Supreme Court, in its December 2023 judgment in the Article 370 case, upheld the constitutional validity of the 2019 changes. At the same time, the Court directed that elections to the Legislative Assembly be held by September 30, 2024 and stated that restoration of statehood should take place at the earliest and as soon as possible.
The Assembly elections were subsequently held in September and October 2024, with results declared on October 8.
The political demand for statehood has continued since then. The Union government’s position, as reiterated by Union Home Minister Amit Shah in 2025, has been that statehood would be restored at an appropriate time. In June 2026, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah also met Prime Minister Narendra Modi and raised the issue of early restoration of statehood, describing it as important for democratic institutions and public participation.
The debate therefore is not simply about whether Jammu and Kashmir should have an elected government. It already does. The deeper question is how much constitutional authority that elected government should possess.
There is also a legitimate argument on the other side. Those who favour retaining the present Union Territory structure can point to the distinctive security circumstances of Jammu and Kashmir and the importance of central control over matters such as police and public order. Those concerns cannot simply be dismissed. At the same time, supporters of statehood argue that democratic accountability is strengthened when decisions affecting citizens are taken by institutions directly answerable to an elected legislature.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this debate is that the people of Jammu and Kashmir should not view statehood merely through the language of political parties.
The real test should be institutional.
Will elected representatives have meaningful authority? Will citizens know whom to hold responsible when administration fails? Will decision-making become more transparent? Will the bureaucracy become more accountable to elected institutions? Will Jammu, Kashmir and the other regions of the Union Territory feel equally represented? And, most importantly, will restoration of statehood be accompanied by a stronger culture of responsible governance?
These are questions that deserve attention irrespective of political affiliation.
Jammu and Kashmir has already passed through an extraordinary constitutional transition: from State, to Union Territory, and then to an elected Union Territory government. The next step, whenever it comes, should therefore not be understood merely as a restoration of a title.
For the people, statehood should mean more than the word “State” on a government document. It should mean a clearer chain of democratic responsibility, stronger institutions and greater accountability to the people.
The debate over statehood is ultimately a debate about the architecture of governance. And if restoration does take place, its success should not be measured by how loudly it is celebrated, but by how meaningfully it improves the relationship between the government and the governed.
(The author is final-year B.A. LL.B. student, Department of Law, School of Legal Studies, Central University of Kashmir. He can be reached at [email protected])
